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The effects of individual and neighborhood characteristics on relative FHA-
insured mortgage applications and originations are examined. A sample of low-
and moderate-income households drawn from the 1990 and 1991 Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act is analyzed using census tract data. Although the relationship be-
tween relative FHA-insured mortgage activity and minority composition in a census
tract is not significant, there is a negative relationship between median family income
and FHA-insured mortgage activity controlling for individual characteristics of
borrowers and some census tract characteristics.  1998 Academic Press
Several studies have examined the characteristics of borrowers of Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) insured loans and neighborhoods that the
FHA serves. These studies find that minorities are more likely to use FHA
loans (Canner et al., 1991; Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991); FHA mortgage
activity is higher in central cities and low-income neighborhoods than in
other neighborhoods (MacRae et al., 1982; Barth et al., 1983). However,
these studies have left some questions unanswered. First, ex post data are
used in their analyses. Therefore, it is not clear whether minorities are
more likely to get FHA loans because they demand more FHA loans or
because they are more likely to be denied for conventional loans. It is
known that minorities are exposed to FHA loans more often than whites
(Yinger, 1991). Second, since FHA loans are assumable, studies based on
loans that home owners actually have, rather than those that they selected
at the time of purchase, may reflect effects other than mortgage choice.
Third, previous studies that examine the effect of indivdual and neighbor-
hood characteristics on FHA borrowing are not very comprehensive. In
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general, they use either the American Housing Survey or the Survey of
Consumer Finances. The former covers only a few MSAs and the latter
samples mostly from relatively high-income households.
This study tries to eliminate some of the problems faced by the previous
research in answering the empirical question of what markets and whom
FHA mortgage insurance programs serve. First, the dataset used in this
study is taken from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data
which are most relevant U.S. observations.1 Second, it examines both mort-
gage applications (pre-approval demand) and mortgage originations (post-
approval outcome) in order to identify whether mortgage applications for
FHA loans differ from mortgage originations. Third, the empirical model
tries to segregate the individual effects from the neighborhood effects.
Answering the question of what kind of people or neighborhoods the
FHA serves will be useful for housing policy makers who decide continuity
and availability of FHA-insured mortgage loans to these individuals and
neighborhoods. Recent developments in the mortgage insurance market
might jeopardize the continuity of the FHA’s mortgage insurance programs.
First, the FHA’s losses were close to $6 billion during the 1980s (Hender-
shoot and Waddell, 1992). Second, the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1992 requires that a certain percentage of mortgages purchased
by Government Sponsored Enterprises should be from central cities which
are considered to be served by the FHA loans and for housing units occupied
by families with income less than the median income (Weicher, 1994).
Third, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
of 1989 requires Home Loan Banks to subsidize low income housing.
This study shows that although the relationship between relative FHA-
insured mortgage activity and minority composition in a census tract is not
significant, there is a negative relationship between median family income
and FHA-insured mortgage activity controlling for individual characteris-
tics of borrowers and some census tract characteristics. In addition, the
results suggest that high black FHA loan originations can be explained by
the high black FHA application.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses previous
studies examining the characteristics of FHA borrowers and their neighbor-
1 Depository institutions, their direct subsidiaries and saving and loan associations and
mortgage lending institutions with assets exceeding $10 million are required to report their
mortgage activities according to the HMDA reporting requirements. However, there is a
debate about the coverage of the HMDA dataset. For example, comparing the loans purchased
by Freddie Mac with the loans sold to Freddie Mac as reported in the 1992 HMDA dataset,
Berkovec and Zorn (1996) estimate that the 1992 HMDA dataset contains only 70 percent
of the total loans purchased by Freddie Mac even though the coverage of mortgage institutions
are expanded at the end of 1991. In addition, their results show that the HMDA coverage
rate is higher in the lower income census tracts relative to the higher income census tracts.
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hoods. The third section explains the empirical model and the data used.
The results of the analysis and the conclusion follow.
BACKGROUND
The aim of the FHA is to increase home ownership among low- and
moderate-income households by insuring home mortgages with low down-
payments.2 In order to achieve this objective, home buyers are required to
pay mortgage insurance to the FHA. In return, lenders are 100% protected
in the case of default on the part of the borrower. Since the FHA requires
a lower downpayment and is more flexible in terms of other liquidity
conditions,3 liquidity-constrained and riskier borrowers are expected to
receive more FHA loans than conventional loans relative to less risky
borrowers (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991).
In the mortgage choice literature, it is generally argued that individual
borrowers maximize their expected utilities given their budget sets and
wealth. Individuals who do not have enough down payment or who are
constrained by the underwriting requirements of the private mortgage insur-
ance companies are found to be more likely to choose an FHA loan relative
to a conventional loan (for example, see Hendershoot and LaFayette, 1994).
Theoretically, Brueckner (1985) shows that those borrowers who get higher
utility from current consumption are more likely to get an FHA loan.
However, although Bruecker assumes a competitive and homogeneous
mortgage market in his model, the real mortgage market is not homoge-
neous; the lenders would offer different mortgages at different rates to
their borrowers, depending on their riskiness. Therefore, each borrower
faces a different choice set, depending on a borrower’s riskiness or on
other factors.
It can be argued that lenders originate different mortgages based on the
riskiness of an applicant. If the mortgage applicant is riskier, lenders can
credit ration their customers either by increasing the interest rate on the
2 An individual borrower can get a mortgage without insurance if the loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio is below 0.80. If LTV ratio is above 0.80, lenders require borrowers to procure mortgage
insurance which affords protection to lenders in case of a default of an individual borrower.
Private mortgage insurance companies generally do not insure mortgages with LTV ratios
above 0.95. If they do, they price them to reflect additional risk. However, during the years
of this study, through the FHA, it was possible to get FHA-insured mortgages with high
LTV ratios.
3 For example, according to the government sponsored enterprises’ underwriting require-
ments, the monthly payment for mortgage principal, interest, taxes and insurance must be
less than 28% of the monthly gross income. According to the FHA, total housing expenses
to net income ratio should be 0.36.
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conventional loan or by deciding not to provide the conventional loan to
those borrowers. Duca and Rosenthal (1991) show that the FHA share of
mortgage origination increases as the aggegate default risk increases. A
study by Yinger (1991) has found that blacks and other minorities are more
likely than whites to be notified about the availability of FHA-insured
mortgages. The results of previous studies that blacks are more likely to
get an FHA loan (for example, Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1991; Canner et
al., 1991) might be explained by the idea that blacks are more likely to
apply for an FHA loan. Then, the results would not be because of a high
mortgage denial rate but rather because of a high FHA application rate
by black households. In addition, since the FHA provides 100% insurance
to lenders in the case of a default by the borrower, lenders have an incentive
to originate FHA loans relative to conventional loans when the default
risk for a borrower is high.
There is a correlation between the individual characteristics and the
neighborhood characteristics in which an individual lives. For example,
Gabriel and Rosenthal (1989) show that there is a tendency among minori-
ties to live in minority neighborhoods. It implies that not only individual
characteristics but also neighborhood characteristics may affect the type of
loan applied for or received. However, most of the previous studies examin-
ing the effect of neighborhood characteristics on FHA mortgage activity
do not control for individual factors (for example, MacRae et al., 1982;
Megbolugbe et al., 1994). Therefore, it is not possible to conclude whether
blacks are more likely to get FHA loans because they are black, live in
neighborhoods with growing minority population, or live in central cities,
or are more likely to apply for the FHA-insured loans. Although Canner
et al. (1991) control for some neighborhood characteristics in the analysis
of the probability of getting a conventional loan, their sample is very small.
This study investigates the effect of neighborhood characteristics on
relative FHA mortgage activity by controlling for the individual mortgage
applicant’s characteristics. In addition, it examines the effect of individual
characteristics on mortgage applications and originations between FHA-
insured and conventional loans by controlling for neighborhood characteris-
tics. The next section explains the empirical model used in this study.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
The current literature on the mortgage choice between FHA and conven-
tional loans suggests that the factors affecting the mortgage choice can
be basically grouped into two categories: individual and neighborhood
characteristics. Individual factors include race, default risk, liquidity condi-
tion, age, available wealth of an individual, and value of a house. All
affect the type of mortgage that an individual can receive. Neighborhood
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characteristics include demographic factors such as racial composition, eco-
nomic factors, housing characteristics, FHA loan limit, and availability of
alternative mortgage instruments or mortgage programs in the neighbor-
hood. So, in the analysis of what markets and what individuals the FHA
serves, both individual and neighborhood factors should be included in the
model. Given this information, the general model for an individual’s choice
for an FHA loan can be written
P(FHAuapply for a mortgage)i 5 f(XIi , XNi), (1)
where P(FHAuapply for a mortgage)i is the probability than an individual
i applies for an FHA loan given that an individual i applied for a mortgage.
XIi and XNi represent the characteristics of individual i and the characteris-
tics of the neighborhood where individual i lives, respectively.
A variety of functional forms can be used to present the relationship in
equation (1). A linear probability model is selected as a specification for
this equation because of the size of the HMDA data,
P(FHAuXI , XN)i 5 a0 1 XIia1 1 XNia2 1 ei , (2)
where P(FHAuXI , XN)i is the conditional probability that individual i will
apply for an FHA loan given individual and neighborhood characteristics.
If the error term in the regression equation, ei , meets the assumptions of
the classical regression model, the coefficients in Eq. (2) can be estimated
consistently. If data on XI and XN were available, all of the apparatus of
the classical model would apply. However, in reality, some of the variables
that are represented by XI and XN are not available and may have only
crude proxies. Thus, the actual variables can be expressed as a combination
of observed variables and error terms,
XIi 5 INDIVIDUALi 1 eIi
XNn 5 NEIGHBORHOODn 1 eNn ,
where INDIVIDUALi represents a vector of characteristics of individual i,
reported in the HMDA data, which are used as proxies for the actual vari-
ables, XI . Similarly, NEIGHBORHOODn represents a vector of characteris-
tics of neighborhoods available from the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Censuses that
are used as proxies for the actual neighborhood characteristics, XN . eIi and
eNn are the error terms since INDIVIDUALi and NEIGHBORHOODn are
only proxies for the actual variables. Thus, Eq. (2) can be written
P(FHAuXI , XN)i 5 a0 1 INDIVIDUALia1 1 NEIGHBORHOODia2 1 ui ,
(3)
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where ui 5 ei 2 a1eIi 2 a2eNi . Since INDIVIDUALi and NEIGHBOR-
HOODi are correlated with error terms, one of the central assumptions of
the classical regression model is violated and the least squares estimation
will not provide consistent estimates. In order to get consistent estimates,
a two-stage estimation mechanism is used in the analysis,4
Step I: P(FHAuXI , XN)in 5 a*0 1 a*I INDIVIDUALi 1 ON
n51
bnDin 1 e*in
Step II: b̂n 5 d*0 1 d
*
N NEIGHBORHOODn 1 e*n ,
where Din is a vector of dummy variables indicating the census tract n where
the loan application of an individual i is located and b̂n represents the fixed
effect coefficient on neighborhood n estimated from the regression equation
in the first step. The consistent estimates of the coefficients on individual
characteristics are obtained from the fixed effects model in the first stage.5
The second step is estimated at the neighborhood level. The estimated fixed
effect coefficient in the first stage is used as a dependent variable in the second
stage. It is regressed against neighborhood characteristics.
Two-stage analysis with the fixed effects model provides the benefit of
getting pure effects at each level. For example, estimation at the individual
level disentangles neighborhood effects. In addition to getting consistent
estimates, another reason for the selection of two-stage analysis is that
given the size of the HMDA data, it was impossible to estimate the model
specified in Eq. (2). However, there is a disadvantage of getting biased
estimates of standard errors. The next discussion presents the variables
used in the estimation in each stage.
First Stage: Individual Level
In the first stage, it is assumed that an individual’s mortgage application
can be expressed as a function of some individual characteristics, such as
income, race, sex, existence of a co-applicant, and neighborhood (census
tract). A linear probability model is estimated at the individual level with
the census tract fixed effects,
4 This mechanism will eliminate the problem of getting inconsistent estimates due to the
correlation between XI and eN , or the correlation between XN and eI . The problem of getting
inconsistent estimates due to measurement errors still holds. For more detailed information
on two-stage procedure, see Avery et al. (1993, 1994).
5 The coefficients are consistent because including dummy variables for each neighborhood
in the model makes the error terms exclude any unobserved or observed neighborhood effects
from the estimated coefficients on individual variables.
HMDA EVIDENCE ON FHA MORTGAGE ACTIVITY 349
Step I: P(FHA)in 5 ON
n51
bnDni 1 INDIVIDUALinaI 1 e*in ,
where P(FHA)in is operationalized to be 1 if an individual i, in a census
tract n, is applying for or getting an FHA loan; it is 0 if the loan is a
conventional loan. It is a conditional probability of applying for an FHA
loan given that an individual applies for a mortgage. INDIVIDUALin repre-
sents a vector of an individual i’s characteristics living in a neighborhood
n. The individual variables include the existence of a co-applicant, the sex,
income, and race of an applicant, and those of a co-applicant. Ideally, more
individual characteristics such as wealth, credit rating, age, and risk of an
individual borrower need to be controlled for in the mortgage application
process. However, the HMDA dataset does not provide such information.
Therefore, only those individual characteristics reported in the HMDA
dataset are included in the model. A reduced form model is estimated with
income and some demographic characteristics of the individual applicant
since the loan amount is endogeneous because of the FHA loan limit. It
is known that the income level of some minority groups is different from
that of whites. Therefore, the interaction variables for race and income are
also included in the model.
Second Stage: Neighborhood (Census Tract) Level
The second stage is the estimation at the census tract level. The dependent
variable in this stage is the fixed effect coefficient on each census tract
dummy variable, estimated in the first stage. In other words, it is a part of
FHA activity that is not explained by individual factors aggregated at the
census tract level. Thus, the dependent variable is
Fixed effect coefficient 5 b̂n 5 FHAn 2 INDIVIDUALn âI ,
where FHAn is the observed percentage of FHA-insured applications in
census tract n (FHAn 5 (o
Nn
i51 FHAin) /Nn , where Nn is the number of
individual applications in census tract n and FHAin is 1 if it is an FHA
loan), INDIVIDUALn is the average of each individual variable in tract
n (INDIVIDUALn 5 (o
Nn
i51 INDIVIDUALin)/Nn), and â1 represents the
estimated coefficients on each individual variable in the first step.
In the second stage, these neighborhood residuals are regressed on the
various neighborhood characteristics. Two models are estimated in this
stage,
Model I: b̂n 5 d 1 NEIGHBORHOODndN 1 en
Model II: b̂n 5 OM
m51
dmDm 1 NEIGHBORHOODndN 1 en ,
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where NEIGHBORHOODn represents the variables representing the
neighborhood characteristics in the census tract n. Dm represents dummy
variables indicating an MSA m where a census tract n is located. Model I
assumes that it is the tract characteristics that count (within and between
MSA variation). It shows the general effect of neighborhood characteristics
on the probability of applying for or getting an FHA loan. Model II answers
how neighborhood characteristics affect the probability of applying for or
getting an FHA loan within the same MSA because some of the variation
in FHA activity among neighborhoods can be attributed to the MSA charac-
teristics such as FHA loan limit (within MSA variation).
The neighborhood characteristics are grouped into three categories: de-
mographic characteristics, economic characteristics and housing market
characteristics. Demographic characteristics include the minority percent-
age of residents in the neighborhood, the change in minority share from
1980 to 1990, and the age distribution of the household heads. Minority
shares in neighborhood in 1990 are represented with splines6 in order to
identify the effect of the different levels of minority shares in the census
tract. In addition, the changes in minority shares from 1980 to 1990 are
represented with dummy variables. An age of an individual applicant is
approximated by the distribution of age of household heads in the neighbor-
hood in 1990. In order to control for the size of the housing unit that an
individual borrower will buy, the average household size for the owner-
occupied units is also included in the model. The bigger the household, the
more likely it is to demand a larger (more expensive) house, and the less
likely to apply for and get an FHA loan, because of the FHA loan limit.
Economic characteristics are represented by median family income, its
splines, and the dummy variables representing the percentage change in
median family income from 1980 to 1990. A study by MacRae et al. (1983)
finds a quadratic relationship between FHA activity and median income
level in a neighborhood. A nonlinear relationship is imposed in the model
with median family income splines.
Housing market characteristics include the distribution of housing units
in terms of the number of units in structure, the housing occupancy vari-
ables, the change in housing occupancy variables during the decade from
1980 to 1990, and the age distribution of housing units. It can be hypothe-
sized that if the vacancy or rental rate is high in the neighborhood, the
probability of deterioration is also high, and FHA activity will be high. In
addition, if the percentage of older houses in the neighborhood is high, the
probability of getting an FHA loan is expected to be high. Housing occu-
pancy is measured by the rental and vacancy rates in 1990 and the change
6 Throughout the range of values of minority share, the probability of getting an FHA loan
might be rising, but the slope might change at some percentages. One could fit the regression
model by dividing the sample into subsamples and use dummy variables. However, this would
neglect the continuity of the function. Instead, a spline function is applied.
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in theserates during thepast decade. Sincethe FHA providesmortgage insur-
ance for one- to four-family units, the rental rate, vacancy rate, and change
in these rates are considered only for 1–4 housing units. The growth rate in
total housing units is included in the model in order to control for the general
economic conditions. The age of housing stock is approximated by the per-
centage of housing units built in different time periods. Previous studies find
that FHA activity is high in central cities, and these areas are found to be
underserved by conventional mortgage lenders. A central city dummy vari-
able is added to the model. The next section describes the data.
DATA
Only owner-occupied new home purchase mortgage applicants are in-
cluded in the sample because a borrower has to be an owner-occupant to
get an FHA loan. The sample includes only those households that have
income less than or equal to 120% of the median family income in the
corresponding Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). They can be consid-
ered as representing low- and moderate-income households which are
aimed to be served by the FHA.
Mortgage Applications and Originations
Individual level data are obtained from the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) data. According to this Act, the depository institutions (com-
mercial banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks and credit
unions), their direct subsidiaries, and other unaffiliated mortgage lending
institutions with assets more than $10 million (Canner and Gabriel, 1992) are
required to provide information about their mortgage applicants. The data
have the highest coverage of mortgage applications in the United States.7
In this study, two years of HMDA datasets are used, 1990 and 1991. All
mortgages are divided into two groups: FHA loans and conventional loans.
In this study, all other loans that are not insured by the FHA are classified
as conventional loans. They include state mortgage programs, privately
insured loans and uninsured loans. The Veterans Administration (VA) and
Farmers Home Association (FmHA) insured loans are not included in
the sample.
Some characteristics of the applicants in the sample are presented in
Table I. The samples from the 1990 and 1991 HMDA datasets show similar
characteristics. The percentage of FHA-insured loans is higher than normal
because of the elimination of high-income applicants and borrowers. The
7 During 1990 and 1991, the HMDA did not require smaller mortgage bankers to report
their mortgage activities. Hence, the exclusion of the smaller mortgage bankers from the
dataset will result in the underrepresentation of FHA loans. According to Berkovec and Zorn
(1996), the HMDA dataset for 1992 is estimated to contain only 65% of total mortgage loans.
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percentage of FHA-insured mortgage applicants who are black is 13.3 (13.1)
in 1990 (1991).8 However, the percentage of conventional loan applicants
who are black is only 5.8 (5.3). The black percentages decline slightly for
originations: 11.2% (11.3%) of FHA-insured mortgage borrowers and 4.6%
(4.2%) of conventional loan borrowers are black. The denial rates on FHA
loans are lower than the conventional loans: 15.8% (15.7%) versus 20.7%
(21.9%) percent. Although the median loan amount and loan-to-income
ratio for FHA loans are higher than those for conventional loans because
of higher allowable LTV ratios, median incomes of FHA applicants and
borrowers are slightly lower than those for conventional loan borrowers.
Neighborhood Characteristics
The neighborhood data are obtained from the 1980 and the 1990 U.S.
Censuses. In this study, neighborhood and census tract are used inter-
changeably. Rural census tracts and census tracts with zero population
(either in 1990 or in 1980) or those with nonpositive median house values,
nonpositive median family income, or less than 50 total housing units (in
either 1980 or in 1990) are excluded from the sample.9
Table II shows the FHA application and origination rates of census tracts
on the basis of several neighborhood characteristics weighted by the number
of mortgage applications or mortgage originations in each neighborhood.
According to the HMDA data and the U.S. Census, FHA application and
FHA origination rates are higher in central cities and in more minority-popu-
lated, low income, low house value, and high-risk neighborhoods, i.e., those
neighborhoods with low growth rates in median house value and in median
family income from 1980 to 1990. The descriptive statistics of the census tract
characteristics included in the model are presented in the Appendix.
RESULTS
Individual Characteristics
Mortgage Applications. The results of the linear probability model with
neighborhood fixed effects for individual mortgage applications in 1990
and 1991 are presented in Table III. They are similar in both years. Dramatic
8 The figures in parentheses throughout the paper represent the corresponding figures
in 1991.
9 The characteristics of neighborhoods where the lender is located are used as an approxima-
tion for the individual borrower’s neighborhood characteristics because HMDA dataset pro-
vides the location of the loan. Another limitation is that the 1990 and 1991 HMDA data use
1980 census tract definitions. The census tract definitions used in 1990 Census are different
from the ones used in the 1980 Census. A common unit of analysis is needed in combining
these data sets. Claritas converted the 1990 Census data into 1980 census tract definitions.
Therefore, the 1990 Census data provided by Claritas are used in the analysis. Hence, the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Weighted Mean FHA Application and Origination Rates with Respect to
Census Tract Characteristics
Application Origination
1990 1991 1990 1991
Characteristics of neighborhoods
Non-central-city 0.2845 0.2727 0.2982 0.2898
Central city 0.4109 0.3937 0.4272 0.4125
Minority share
0.00–0.05 0.2685 0.2404 0.2804 0.2554
0.05–0.10 0.3343 0.3078 0.3475 0.3210
0.10–0.25 0.3746 0.3629 0.3938 0.3858
0.25–0.50 0.3966 0.3946 0.4180 0.4222
0.50– 0.3778 0.3955 0.3918 0.4226
Change in minority share
Less than 0.00 0.2949 0.2650 0.3136 0.2878
0.00–0.05 0.3131 0.2921 0.3253 0.3066
0.05–0.10 0.3740 0.3641 0.3916 0.3859
0.10–0.15 0.3808 0.3937 0.3988 0.4192
0.15– 0.4329 0.4459 0.4485 0.4692
Median income
Less than $20,000 0.3948 0.3765 0.4191 0.4150
$20,000–$40,000 0.3771 0.3601 0.3990 0.3865
$40,000–$60,000 0.3011 0.2924 0.3107 0.3032
$60,000–$80,000 0.1814 0.1657 0.1868 0.1718
$80,000–$100,000 0.1110 0.0987 0.1152 0.0985
$100,000– 0.0751 0.0548 0.0792 0.0585
Change in median income
Less than 0% 0.3655 0.3423 0.3923 0.3772
0–25% 0.4773 0.4331 0.5012 0.4637
25–50% 0.4632 0.4426 0.4892 0.4739
50–100% 0.3463 0.3303 0.3614 0.3484
100–150% 0.2138 0.2125 0.2236 0.2238
150%– 0.2118 0.2090 0.2227 0.2234
Median house value
Less than $25,000 0.3607 0.3303 0.3866 0.3562
$25,000–$50,000 0.4524 0.4113 0.4796 0.4429
$50,000–$75,000 0.4242 0.3936 0.4455 0.4196
$75,000–$100,000 0.3706 0.3613 0.3858 0.3767
$100,000–$150,000 0.2681 0.2796 0.2808 0.2925
$150,000– 0.1064 0.1140 0.1139 0.1237
Change in median house value
Less than 0% 0.4646 0.4004 0.4815 0.4217
0–25% 0.4787 0.4480 0.4924 0.4629
25–50% 0.4067 0.3763 0.4228 0.3929
50–100% 0.3570 0.3374 0.3729 0.3590
100–150% 0.2418 0.2403 0.2562 0.2599
150%– 0.1104 0.1240 0.1161 0.1308
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racial differences between black and white mortgage applicants are ob-
served in the analysis of low- and moderate-income mortgage applicants.
Blacks were 12.61% (12.28%) more likely to apply for an FHA loan than
white applicants in 1990 (1991), controlling for their income, sex, and co-
applicant and the census tract where they applied for a mortgage. The
difference is found to be less for other racial groups. For example, Hispanics
are 8.01% (9.37%) more likely to apply for an FHA loan, but Native Ameri-
cans are 2.25% (4.88%) less likely to apply for FHA loans than their white
counterparts. No significant difference was found between Asian and
white applicants.
There are several explanations as to why blacks are more likely to apply
for FHA loans than their white counterparts. One explanation is that they
are more likely to be exposed to FHA loans than whites, as reported by
Yinger (1991). A second explanation is that there may be prescreening by
lenders or by an individual applicant, which leads to more FHA applications
because of the higher possibility of rejection with conventional loans. Third,
in general, the relative wealth of blacks is less than that of whites,10 and
they are more likely to be liquidity-constrained than whites (Duca and
Rosenthal, 1993 and 1994). Therefore, they may be more likely to apply
for FHA loans than whites even though they have similar income levels.
Unfortunately, the default risk and liquidity condition of applicants are not
controlled for in this paper.11 Fourth, it can be argued that blacks are more
likely to get smaller houses, requiring smaller loan amounts; hence, they
are more likely to be eligible for FHA loans because of the FHA loan limit.12
10 According to the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, the median total worth and the
median total financial assets of white households are $58,500 and $11,500, respectively. For
nonwhite households, these figures are $4,000 and $2,000, respectively (Kennickel and Shack-
Marquez, 1992).
11 The same model is estimated for a sample of mortgage applicants that have income less
than or equal to 80% of the MSA median family income. The difference still holds between
white and black applicants. For example, black individuals are 11.6% (8.5%) more likely to
apply for FHA loans than white applicants with the same income and sex and in the same
census tract.
12 To answer the question of whether blacks are more likely to apply for FHA loans because
of higher default risk or because of requiring smaller loan amounts, a similar model is estimated
for a sample of applicants with loan amounts less than the FHA mortgage loan limit. In the
estimation, it is assumed that the loan amount is exogenous. In addition to demographic
characteristics, loan amount with splines and loan-amount-to-income ratio as a proxy for
default risk are included in the model. Results are found to be similar. It is found that blacks
are 9.8% (12.6%) more likely to apply for an FHA-insured loan than their white counterparts;
as the loan-to-income ratio increases, the probability of applying for an FHA loan increases;
the black and white differences are found to be greater at higher income levels. For example,
in 1991, a black applicant with a $20,000 income or a $120,000 income is 13.3 or 18.5% more




Linear Probability Model of FHA Application (1) or Conventional Application (0)
for a Sample of Low and Moderate Income Applicants
(Model: P(FHA)in 5 o
N
n51 bnDni 1 INDIVIDUALinaI 1 e*in)
1990 1991
Parameter Parameter
estimate t-value estimate t-value
Race of applicant, co-applicant
(base group: white)
Native American applicant 20.0225 21.26 20.0488 22.63
Asian applicant 0.0093 1.06 20.0050 20.54
Black applicant 0.1261 23.50 0.1228 22.12
Hispanic applicant 0.0801 13.19 0.0937 15.37
Other race applicant 0.0273 1.54 20.0203 21.12
White applicant, minority co-applicant 0.1559 9.90 0.0611 3.78
Minority applicant white co-applicant 0.0850 4.81 0.0972 5.61
Sex of applicant and co-applicant
(base group: female applicant)
Male applicant, female co-applicant 0.0758 5.05 0.0222 1.31
Female applicant, male co-applicant 0.0088 0.58 20.0263 21.54
Male applicant, co-applicant 0.0845 5.45 0.0369 2.11
Female applicant, co-applicant 0.0674 4.36 0.0192 1.11
Male applicant 0.0100 6.91 0.0075 5.33
Income race interaction variables
White 0.0169 20.29 0.0155 15.75
Native American 0.0169 16.83 0.0166 14.57
Asian 0.0157 18.12 0.0146 14.41
Black 0.0167 19.70 0.0158 15.88
Hispanic 0.0163 19.15 0.0151 15.13
Other race 0.0158 16.19 0.0154 13.85
White applicant, minority co-applicant 0.0147 15.54 0.0150 13.89
Minority applicant, white co-applicant 0.0168 17.21 0.0149 13.50
Income splines ($1,000)
Income spline at $15,000 20.0092 26.31 20.0074 24.59
Income spline at $20,000 20.0004 20.26 20.0008 20.57
Income spline at $25,000 0.0009 0.78 20.0008 20.67
Income spline at $30,000 20.0111 210.87 20.0075 27.18
Income spline at $35,000 0.0043 4.18 0.0030 2.88
Income spline at $40,000 20.0034 22.95 20.0048 24.17
Income spline at $45,000 20.0038 24.34 20.0024 22.73
Income and no co-applicant
interaction variables
Income 0.0050 4.39 0.0009 0.74
Income spline at $15,000 0.0008 0.39 0.0043 2.05
Income spline at $20,000 20.0091 24.72 20.0056 22.87
Income spline at $25,000 20.0012 20.69 20.0043 22.57
Income spline at $30,000 0.0025 1.54 0.0033 2.06
Income spline at $35,000 20.0016 20.90 20.0050 22.89
Income spline at $40,000 0.0014 0.69 0.0062 3.13
Income spline at $45,000 0.0028 1.79 0.0004 0.29




estimate t-value estimate t-value
Memo items
Number of observations 783,789 788,799
Number of census tracts 38,008 37,766
R-squared 0.3455 0.3167
Mean of the dependent variable 0.3380 0.3224
When the hypothesis that the effect of income is the same for all racial
groups is tested, it is found that racial groups are not significantly different.
The results show that the differences between whites and blacks in terms
of applying for an FHA loan do not change significantly as income level
changes. For example, at income level $15,000, blacks are 12.31% (12.31%)
percent more likely than whites to apply for FHA loans. This difference
is 13.78% (11.61%) percent at the $50,000 income level.
Mortgage Originations. A similar model is estimated for mortgage origi-
nations to examine whether individual factors affect mortgage originations
and mortgage applications differently. The results are found to be similar
to those for the mortgage applications (Table IV).
Racial differences are also found with respect to mortgage originations.
Blacks are 12.57% (12.21%) more likely to get an FHA loan than whites,
and Hispanics are 8.52% (10.00%) percent more likely to get an FHA loan
than whites. The difference is the probability of FHA origination between
blacks and whites is slightly lower than the difference with FHA applica-
tions. The smaller difference between whites and blacks in terms of FHA
mortgage originations suggests that whites’ relative denial rate for conven-
tional loans is higher than blacks’ relative denial rate. According to the
HMDA datasets, blacks are 1.96 (2.35) times more likely than whites to
be denied conventional loans. The relative denial rate for FHA loans is
higher: blacks are 2.26 times more likely than whites to be denied.13 Another
possibility is that whites may be applying for higher loan amounts than
other racial groups, leading to higher relative denial rates in conventional
loans since loan amount is not included in this model.14
The effect of income level on mortgage originations is similar to that on
13 According to the 1990 (1991) HMDA datasets, the black denial rates for conventional
and FHA loans are 37.39% (31.5%) and 29.16% (28.10%), respectively. The white denial rate
is 19.03% (13.40%) for conventional loans and 12.86% (11.90%) for FHA loans.
14 It is found that controlling for the loan amount and a proxy for default risk, blacks are
10.3% (13.3%) more likely to get an FHA loan than whites.
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TABLE IV
Linear Probability Model of FHA Origination (1) or Conventional Origination (0)
for Borrowers with Income Less Than $50,000
(Model: P(FHA)in 5 o
N
n51 bnDni 1 INDIVIDUALinaI 1 e*in)
1990 1991
Parameter Parameter
estimate t-value estimate t-value
Race of applicant, co-applicant
(base group: white)
Native American applicant 20.0502 22.30 20.0560 22.45
Asian applicant 20.0160 21.61 20.0365 23.45
Black applicant 0.1257 18.33 0.1221 17.14
Hispanic applicant 0.0852 11.48 0.1000 13.25
Other race applicant 0.0124 0.59 20.0220 21.01
White applicant, minority co-applicant 0.1815 9.99 0.0504 2.66
Minority applicant, white co-applicant 0.1055 5.02 0.0939 4.45
Sex of applicant and co-applicant
(base group: female applicant)
Male applicant, female co-applicant 0.0769 3.65 0.0291 1.22
Female applicant, male co-applicant 0.0172 0.81 20.0118 20.49
Male applicant, co-applicant 0.0905 4.20 0.0575 2.35
Female applicant, co-applicant 0.0665 3.09 0.0284 1.17
Male applicant 0.0201 12.44 0.0169 10.51
Income race interaction variables
White 0.0167 14.59 0.0149 11.08
Native American 0.0172 13.05 0.0161 10.66
Asian 0.0160 13.59 0.0146 10.62
Black 0.0166 14.26 0.0154 11.30
Hispanic 0.0161 13.79 0.0145 10.64
Other race 0.0158 12.23 0.0148 10.01
White applicant, minority co-applicant 0.0139 11.15 0.0146 10.15
Minority applicant, white co-applicant 0.0161 12.53 0.0145 9.84
Income splines ($1,000)
Income spline at $15,000 20.0079 24.16 20.0050 22.37
Income spline at $20,000 20.0019 21.11 20.0041 22.28
Income spline at $25,000 0.0002 0.15 0.0004 0.30
Income spline at $30,000 20.0100 28.80 20.0078 26.53
Income spline at $35,000 0.0042 3.75 0.0030 2.55
Income spline at $40,000 20.0037 22.95 20.0047 23.68
Income spline at $45,000 20.0040 24.21 20.0025 22.60
Income and no co-applicant
interaction variables
Income 0.0057 3.64 0.0020 1.14
Income spline at $15,000 20.0028 21.07 0.0008 0.28
Income spline at $20,000 20.0065 22.86 20.0032 21.36
Income spline at $25,000 20.0009 20.48 20.0049 22.49
Income spline at $30,000 0.0024 1.38 0.0038 2.11
Income spline at $35,000 20.0021 21.11 20.0044 22.35
Income spline at $40,000 0.0024 1.12 0.0056 2.60
Income spline at $45,000 0.0023 1.34 0.0006 0.34




estimate t-value estimate t-value
Memo items
Number of observations 634,586 631,622
Number of census tracts 37,138 36,871
R-squared 0.3622 0.3295
Mean of the dependent variable 0.3517 0.3393
mortgage applications. At income levels below $30,000, income and the
probability of FHA origination are positively correlated; at income levels
above $30,000, they are negatively correlated. At income level of $15,000,
blacks’ probability of getting an FHA loan is 12.42% (12.96%) higher than
that of whites. This is 12.07% (14.71%) at the income level of $50,000.
The difference between whites and other racial groups at different income
levels in terms of the expected probability of getting an FHA loan is
similar to the differences in the expected probability of FHA applications.
However, results do not explain why the results differ in two years. It
may be because of policy changes or changes in the characteristics of
white applicants.
The next section examines how neighborhood characteristics affect the
individuals’ probabilities of applying for and getting an FHA loan, control-
ling for individual characteristics.
Neighborhood Characteristics
Mortgage Applications.15 The estimations for FHA applications are pre-
sented in Table V. The regression results show that the correlation between
the probability of applying for an FHA loan and minority percentage in
census tract is positive in less and highly minority-populated census tracts,
but it is negative in moderately minority-populated census tracts. In addi-
tion, the probability of applying for an FHA loan is found to be positively
correlated with the change in minority share over the last decade.
Results with respect to housing characteristics are similar to expectations.
15 Three different dependent variables are used in the analysis of the effect of neighborhood
characteristics on mortgage applications and originations: the 1990/1991 average of fixed
census tract effects, the fixed census tract effects obtained from the 1990 estimates, and the
fixed census tract effects obtained from the 1991 estimates. The results are similar for the
years 1990 and 1991 and the averages of 1990 and 1991 figures weighted by the number of
applications in each year. Only the results with the 1990–1991 averages are presented. The







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HMDA EVIDENCE ON FHA MORTGAGE ACTIVITY 363
It is found that vacancy and rental rates on one-to-four housing units and
growth in housing units are negatively related, and the change in rental
rate and vacancy rate from 1980 to 1990 are positively related to the proba-
bility of FHA applications.
It can be argued that FHA loans are preferred by young households
because most of them are liquidity-constrained (Duca and Rosenthal, 1994).
Results support this argument. Although the individual’s age is not included
in the model directly, it is found that if the percentage of households with
older head of household is higher in the census tract the probability of
applying for an FHA loan is lower. The results show a negative relationship
between average household size in the census tract and the probability of
applying for an FHA loan. As expected, the probability of applying for an
FHA loan is found to be higher in central cities than in suburbs, controlling
for individual characteristics and economic, demographic, and housing mar-
ket characteristics of census tracts.
It is very difficult to interpret these results because several variables are
included in the model at the census tract level. Therefore, the results are also
presented in graphical form. Two census tract characteristics are selected for
the analysis because most of the recent policy changes are based on these
variables. They are minority share and median family income in the census
tract. Three different relative FHA application rates are shown in the graphs:
(1) Gross FHA rates,
(2) Adjusted FHA rates, controlling for individual factors,
(3) Adjusted FHA rates, controlling for individual and neighbor-
hood factors.16
16 The gross FHA rates are the observed FHA rates as shown in Table II. The adjusted
FHA rates are calculated by deducting the estimated FHA rates from the gross FHA rates.
They are normalized to have the same mean as the gross FHA rates. The adjusted FHA
rates, controlling for individual factors, correspond to the residuals from the linear probability
model. The individual and neighborhood adjusted FHA rates are calculated by including all
variables except the variable against which the graph is drawn. For example, minority shares,
their splines, and the change in minority share between 1980 and 1990 are not included in
exploring the effect of minority percentage in the neighborhood. These residuals can be
interpreted as deviations from the predicted FHA activity in a census tract with all white and
with zero or negative change in minority share from 1980 to 1990. Similarly, median family
income, its splines, and the dummy variables for the changes in median family income are
not included in investigating the effects of median family income. The estimated residuals
can be interpreted as deviations of the FHA application rate from a hypothetical neighborhood
with an average tract income. Census tracts are ranked on the basis of the variable under
investigation and are weighted based on the total loan applications. In order to make the
comparisons easier, the probability of applying for an FHA loan is assumed to be zero in
tracts with 0 or 1% minority share, or tracts with an $80,000 or higher median family income.
Each point in the graphs represents the weighted average of FHA activity in the corresponding
census tracts. For example, if there are 100 tracts with 100% minority population, the weighted
mean of the FHA activity of these tracts is taken in order to get a corresponding figure for
all-minority census tracts.
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FIG. 1. FHA application rates versus minority share in census tract (Model II).
The next two subsections examine the effect of two neighborhood character-
istics on relative FHA application rates.
The Effect of Racial Composition in Census Tract. Figure 1 shows that
other than the initial increase from an all-white to a 10-percent minority
share, the relative FHA application rates fluctuate randomly over different
minority shares in the census tract.17 The data indicate that minority share
affects FHA applications when the shift is from an all-white to any mixed
census tract within the same MSA (Model II). However, it does not show
any systematic effect on FHA application rates in any mixed or minority
census tracts. Although individual factors explain some of the variation in
moderately and highly minority populated census tracts, other neighbor-
hood factors do not explain much of the variation in neighborhoods. The
sharp increase from an all-white to a 10% minority census tract may be
explained by the low supply of FHA loans. Unavailability of FHA loans
may lead to a very small FHA applications rate in these census tracts.
17 The figure does not change much when all neighborhoods are compared without control-
ling for the MSA (Model I). Except the initial increase in the FHA application rate from all
white to any minority neighborhoods, the fluctuations on the relative FHA application rates
are observed in all neighborhoods. The difference is observed only in highly minority-populated
census tracts. Even though individual factors explain some of the variation in the more than
90% minority-populated neighborhoods, when other neighborhood factors are controlled in
addition to the individual factors, the relative FHA application rates are expected to be higher
than the observed.
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FIG. 2. FHA application rates versus median family income in census tract (Model II).
Another explanation may be that in those census tracts, the house values
are high, and because of the FHA loan limit, individuals may not be eligible
for FHA loans. A similar relationship is observed when all census tracts
are examined without controlling for the MSA (Model I).
Effect of Median Family Income in Census Tract. The regression results
show that median family income and the probability of applying for an
FHA loan are negatively correlated when the income level is above $60,000
(Model II). Figure 2 shows a negative relationship between FHA activity
and median income. According to this figure, individual factors explain
very small variation in census tracts with low and moderate income levels.
However, in high income census tracts, individual factors do not explain
anything but census tract factors with the exception of income level related
factors explaining most of the variation in FHA application rates.
When all census tracts are compared without controlling for the MSA, it is
found that although the gross difference between $10,000 and $80,000 income
census tracts is around 21.7%, it increases to almost 54.8% controlling for
individual and neighborhood factors (Model I). Figure 3 supports the argu-
ment that median family income in census tract is an important factor in ex-
plaining differences among census tracts. When an individual’s income and
race, and demographic and housing characteristics in census tract are taken
into consideration, low and middle income households are expected to get
more FHA loans in lower-income census tracts than the actual levels. The
observed and predicted differences suggest that the FHA is expected to serve
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FIG. 3. FHA application rates versus median family income in census tract (Model I).
more to low-income census tracts (a median income less than $30,000) given
an individual’s income, race, and other census tract factors. Instead, in reality,
it serves more than predicted in high-income census tracts.
The observed low relative FHA rate in the low-income census tracts may
be because of the definition of conventional loans. In low-income census
tracts, borrowers may be using a state-supported or special mortgage pro-
gram available for low and middle income households. However, loans
issued with these programs are treated as conventional loans in this study
since the HMDA dataset does not differentiate these loans from conven-
tional loans.
FHA Originations
The estimates for FHA originations using 1990/91 averages as dependent
variables are presented in Table V. The effects of the neighborhood charac-
teristics on the relative FHA originations are found to be similar to their
effects on applications. The signs of almost all coefficients in mortgage
origination model are the same as those in the mortgage application model.
The graphs also indicate that the impact of minority percentage and that
of median family income in census tract on the relative FHA origination
rates are similar to their impacts on the relative FHA application rates.
For example, other than the initial increase in the FHA origination rates
in an all-white to any mixed census tract, the relative FHA origination
rates do not show any systematic relationship with respect to the minority
percentage in the census tract. Similar to mortgage applications, the FHA
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FIG. 4. Differences in gross and adjusted FHA application rates by race versus minority
percentage in census tract.
origination rates are found to decrease with increases in median family
income.18
Racial Differences
The neighborhood characteristics may affect each racial group’s mortgage
behavior in a different way. In this section, the interaction between individu-
al’s race and the racial composition and median family income in a neighbor-
hood are examined.19 Three racial groups are compared: whites, blacks,
and Hispanics.
Minority Percentage in Census Tract. Figure 4 shows the differences in
gross and adjusted FHA application rates between whites and other racial
groups in census tracts with different minority shares. Although the gross
relative FHA application rate for black individuals is higher than that for
white individuals, when individual and neighborhood characteristics are
controlled, it is found that blacks are expected to have lower relative
FHA application rates than whites in white-populated and highly minority-
18 The graphs are similar to graphs of mortgage applications. In order to continue the
discussion without any interruption from graphs, they are not presented. They are available
from the author upon request.
19 All the remaining graphs are based on the estimations using Model II. The results with
Model I are similar to the graphs presented in the paper. They are available from the author
upon request.
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FIG. 5. FHA application rates by race controlling for individual factors versus minority
percentage in census tract.
populated census tracts and the difference disappears in moderately minor-
ity-populated census tracts. The difference between Hispanics and white
applicants does not decline much when individual and other neighborhood
factors are controlled for.
When only individual factors are included in the model,20 white and black
FHA application rates show similarities (Fig. 5). White and black mortgage
applicants with the same income level have a similar probability of applying
for an FHA loan in both low and moderately minority-populated census
tracts. However, in very highly minority-populated census tracts, whites
are expected to apply for FHA loans more often than their black counter-
parts. On the other hand, Hispanic borrowers with the same level of income
have a higher probability of applying for an FHA loan than their white
and black counterparts, controlling for their income and sex.
Median Family Income. Both the gross and adjusted differences be-
tween blacks and whites and between Hispanics and whites first increase
and then fluctuate as the median income in the census tract increases (Fig.
6). However, this difference almost disappears at the higher income census
tracts when individual and other neighborhood factors are controlled for.
20 In this graph, the relative FHA rates, controlling for individual factors, are normalized
to have a value of zero in 1% minority neighborhoods.
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FIG. 6. Differences in gross and adjusted FHA application rates by race versus median
family income in census tract.
Hence, the difference between racial groups in FHA application rates can be
explained by income and sex of applicant and neighborhood characteristics.
Interestingly, in the low income census tracts, controlling for individual
and neighborhood factors, whites are expected to have higher relative FHA
application rates than their black counterparts. This is also observed when
Hispanic applicants are compared with white applicants. When only individ-
ual factors are controlled for, whites’ relative FHA application rates decline
with the median family income (Fig. 7), but blacks’ and Hispanics’ relative
FHA application rates show a quadratic relationship with median family
income.
Although the gross and adjusted differences are found to be showing
similar patterns with respect to mortgage originations, the trend in FHA
originations is slightly different from FHA applications when only individ-
ual factors are controlled for. For example, blacks are more likely to get
FHA loans than whites in all census tracts regardless of minority share.
Central Cities and Suburbs
Central city and suburban tracts are examined separately in order to see
the interaction effects of neighborhood characteristics on relative FHA
rates. In central cities, FHA rates are significantly higher than in suburban
census tracts, and central cities are considered to have more minority popu-
lation and low income households.
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FIG. 7. FHA application rates by race controlling for individual factors versus median
family income in census tract.
When the variation in all census tracts within the same MSA is examined,
it is found that the difference between central city and suburban tracts in
terms of FHA application rates lowers slightly after controlling for individ-
ual and neighborhood factors in almost all census tracts regardless of the
minority share (Fig. 8). Even though individual and other neighborhood
factors explain some of the variation of FHA rates in central cities, they
do not explain much in the suburbs. However, there is more fluctuation in
relative FHA application rates in the suburbs than in central cities when
minority share is more than 50%. Similar to the other results, other than
the initial effect, the minority percentage does not seem to affect the central
city and suburban relative FHA mortgage activity systematically. These
results suggest that the major difference between central cities and suburban
areas can be explained by factors other than minority share in the area
such as median income level. The initial difference can be explained by
the unavailability of FHA loans in the almost all-white census tracts both
in central cities and suburbs.
Figure 9 supports the previous argument that median income level in
the area can explain the differences between central cities and suburban
areas. The gap between central city and suburban tracts in terms of the
gross FHA activity declines in a similar way as median income in the census
tract increases. The differences between central cities and suburban areas
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FIG. 8. FHA application rates by location versus minority percentage in census tract.
disappear when individual factors and other neighborhood characteristics
are controlled within the same MSA. Similar to the other results, a negative
relationship is observed between FHA application rates and median family
income in the suburbs and central cities.
FIG. 9. FHA application rates by location versus median family income in census tract.
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study investigates the effect of individual and neighborhood charac-
teristics on FHA application and origination rates of low- and moderate-
income households defined as those that have income less than or equal
to 120% of the MSA median family income. The major findings of this
study are: (1) Racial composition in a neighborhood has relatively little
effect on relative FHA activity when minority share in the census tract is
more than 10%. (2) As median family income increases, the relative FHA
activity declines. However, high relative FHA activity in low-income neigh-
borhoods can be explained by neither individual nor neighborhood charac-
teristics. (3) The effect of neighborhood characteristics on minority FHA
applications is similar to their effect on white applications. The difference
between whites and blacks in FHA activity disappears in moderate and
high income and in more than 50% minority-populated census tracts. Inter-
estingly, whites are expected to have higher FHA activity in less than 50%
minority-populated and low income census tracts. (4) Central city and
suburban FHA activity are affected in a similar way by minority percent-
age and median family income. The difference in FHA activity between
suburban areas and central cities can be explained by the differences
in median family income. (5) The individual and neighborhood characteris-
tics affect relative FHA application and origination rates in the same
way.
The evidence from the 1990 and 1991 HMDA datasets indicates that
minority population in neighborhood does not have a systematic relation-
ship with FHA activity except the movement from all-white-populated to
any-minority-populated census tracts, and the FHA does play an important
role in low-income census tracts which cannot be explained by individual
characteristics. The finding of previous studies that blacks were more likely
to get FHA loans can be explained by the higher application rate by blacks
for FHA loans than by whites.
These results have several policy implications. They suggest that if the
FHA’s mortgage insurance programs cease, those living in low-income
census tracts will be most affected. The results of this study suggest that if
policies are made based on minority population among the census tract
characteristics, it will not be very effective. Policies should be based on
median family income in neighborhoods or census tracts.
The results should be interpreted with caution. First, several individual
variables, such as wealth, credit history, debt burdens, and default risk, are
not included in the model because of unavailability. They are all important
in the individual’s application for conventional or FHA loans. The inclusion
of these factors into the model would reduce the racial difference as re-
ported by Munnell et al. (1996) who found that even though the role of
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race diminishes with the inclusion of these variables, race was still a signifi-
cant factor in the decision to grant a mortgage. The difference in the FHA
application rates in the low-minority-populated and low-income census
tracts might disappear when the omitted wealth and risk variables are
included. Second, FHA activity is underrepresented due to the unavailabil-
ity of data from small mortgage bankers. However, in general, these mort-
gage bankers operate in the high-minority and low-income census tracts.
Since these results are obtained by excluding them, the relationship is
expected to be stronger when they are included in the analysis. Low FHA
activity in the very low-income census tracts might be explained by the
underrepresentation of FHA activity in these census tracts because of the
exclusion of small mortgage bankers’ activity. Third, this study uses only
the 1990 and 1991 HMDA data. Therefore, the recent changes on the
FHA’s mortgage insurance requirements and the effect of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992 are not observed.
APPENDIX
TABLE A
Mean of Neighborhood Characteristics
1990–1991 averages
Neighborhood characteristics Application Origination
Median house value, 1990 $93,681 $94,463
Percentage change in value, 1980–1990 0.7224 0.7121






Median family income, 1990 $38,680 $39,369
Percentage change in income, 1980–1990 0.7618 0.7670





Central city 0.4353 0.4286
Black share, 1990 0.0940 0.0854
Change in black share, 1980–1990 0.0194 0.0183








Neighborhood characteristics Application Origination
Nonblack minority share, 1990 0.1025 0.0975
Change in nonblack minority share, 1980–1990 0.0305 0.0294






Share of 1 unit attached 0.0603 0.0614
Share of 2 units 0.0427 0.0421
Share of 3–4 units 0.0426 0.0418
Share of 5 or more units 0.1530 0.1529
Share of mobile homes 0.0686 0.0643
Rental rate, 1990 0.2906 0.2863
Change in rental rate, 1980–1990 0.0247 0.0250
Rental rate (1–4 units), 1990 0.2112 0.2056
Change in rental rate (1–4 units) 0.0150 0.0146
Total 1–4 units, 1990 2622 2645
Growth in total housing units, 1980–1990 0.4890 0.5025
Growth in 1–4 housing units, 1980–1990 0.6901 0.7312
Vacancy rate, 1990 0.0722 0.0700
Vacancy rate, 1–4 units, 1990 0.0585 0.0565
Change in vacancy rate, 1980–1990 0.0071 0.0061
Change in vacancy rate, 1–4 units 0.0034 0.0025
Share of housing units built in 1981–1990 0.1758 0.1737
Share of housing units built in 1979–1980 0.0599 0.0609
Share of housing units built in 1975–1978 0.1391 0.1413
Share of housing units built in 1970–1974 0.1603 0.1606
Share of housing units built in 1960–1969 0.2083 0.2084
Share of housing units built in 1950–1959 0.1657 0.1656
Share of housing units built in 1940–1949 0.0906 0.0891
Share of household heads aged 25–34 0.1741 0.1753
Share of household heads aged 35–44 0.2435 0.2454
Share of household heads aged 45–54 0.1812 0.1815
Share of household heads aged 55–64 0.1576 0.1567
Share of household heads aged 65–74 0.1402 0.1391
Share of household heads aged 75– 0.0879 0.0868
Average household size (owner-occupied) 2.7738 2.7712
Number of census tracts 36,641 35,464
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